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Abstract
We propose a model of seasonal gas markets which is flexible
enough to include supply and demand shocks while also consider-
ing exhaustibility. The relative performances of alternative policies
based on price caps and associated measures or tariffs are discussed.
We illustrate with structural estimates on US data how this theory
can be used to give insights into the intertemporal incidence of policy
instruments.
1 Introduction
As energy markets become tenser and dependency on foreign imports in-
crease in most economies, it is a challenging task to draw the picture of the
modern gas industry. We analyze in a coherent framework this industry by
focusing on the economics of seasonal storage. Our approach is thus a use-
ful complement to the models that focus on other relevant aspects of the
gas industry, like transportation and its regulation (e.g. Teece, 1990, Banks,
2007). We then broaden the scope by bringing into the picture gas price
shocks, trends as well as public policies.
Storage is the most natural source of flexibility in the gas sector, since
consumption, strongly influenced by weather, is seasonal and supply is rel-
atively inflexible. Storing gas thus serves to avoid oversized extraction and
transportation infrastructures, as well as to limit excessive price fluctuations.
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To focus on these economic mechanisms, we investigate the relationship be-
tween stored quantities and prices in a model where time is discrete and
infinite. Years are split into two seasons, a simplification that is grossly
acceptable since we focus on aggregate dynamics of the economy. We char-
acterize the competitive equilibrium and find realistic conditions for storage
to be seasonal (stocks are empty each year at the end of winter). Stockpiling
in summer and withdrawal in winter is shown to be consistent with random
shocks and exhaustibility of natural gas.
Although there would seem to be limited scope for government inter-
vention in a competitive gas sector, public decisions are rarely motivated
by pure efficiency considerations. To clarify the effects of different policies,
we characterize the best outcome a government can implement to maximize
consumers’ surplus when gas is mainly imported. The basic novelty of our
analysis is that, modeling seasonal storage, we explicitly take into account the
intertemporal incidence of policy instruments such as a price cap associated
with quantitative restraints, or taxes.
The price cap succeeds in smoothing prices but discourages storage and
implies winter rationing. We show that, in theory, this distortion can be
attenuated by adopting side measures such as summer rationing. Taxes in
fact are a more effective policy instrument to exert monopsony power on
foreign producers, as a multiseason scheme spreads the distortions better
than a winter price cap. Taxes decrease consumption, domestic production
and imports compared to the competitive allocation. Whether storage is
discouraged or not depends finely on the relative impact of taxes between
the two seasons.
We provide an illustration of our model by estimating and testing it on
US data. The US is the largest consumer of natural gas in the world (about
a quarter of the total) and also the largest importer (BP Statistical Review,
2007).1 This market also offers an interesting perspective on policy inter-
vention: according to the FERC Energy Policy Act of 2005, moderating the
recurrence and severity of “boom and bust” cycles while meeting increasing
demand at reasonable prices is one of the major challenges facing the US nat-
ural gas industry today. Rationing was common in the United States during
the 1970s’ winters, as a consequence of restrictive regulatory policy on well-
head prices. More recently, several examples of specific policy interventions
can be found at the state level in terms of excise taxes or gas price ceilings
as emergency measures.2 The estimation results show that the optimal price
1An overview of the US natural gas industry in Appendix A.1 recalls basic facts on the
yearly gas cycle and gives orders of magnitude.
2Ohio levies a public utility excise tax on natural gas utilities and pipeline companies.
Other States, like North Carolina, impose an excise tax on piped natural gas received for
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cap is globally (i.e. in terms of social surplus) less distortionary than opti-
mal tariffs, but it is less attractive for residents. The price cap discourages
storage, as predicted, and more than tariffs.
The questions about storage are not new. In the theoretical literature, the
“supply of storage” models (Kaldor, 1939, Working, 1948, Brennan, 1958)
are mainly interested in the role of storage when the economy experiences
unexpected shocks. However, very few papers tackle the specific issues of
seasonal storage. Brennan (1960) sees it as a mere aspect of general purpose
models. Pyatt (1978) considers continuous time stationary demand and sup-
ply subject to a fixed seasonal pattern that might not correspond. He shows
how storage regulates the rate at which output increases over time. Lowry
et al. (1987) analyze the role that storage plays in allocating supplies within
the year in the soybean market. The authors characterize competitive spec-
ulative storage and in particular estimate the expected price function using
computational rational expectations methods, when both demand and pro-
duction are random.
Our focus on yearly cycles over an infinite horizon is a distinguishing
feature from storage models that use high frequency data for price simulations
and predictions in a short-medium term time frame (Ur`ıa and Williams,
2007).
A unique approach to some of the issues we address is to be found in
Amundsen (1991), who investigates the social optimization problem of three
operations: the extraction of natural gas from a reservoir up to its depletion,
the supply to the storage unit (where either gas passes through or is stored),
the transfer to end-users. Amundsen’s model is rich and complex. Dynamics
of extraction, inflows/outflows from storage, deliveries to consumers are con-
nected so intricately that policy analysis is practically impossible. However,
this issue is of crucial importance.
Public interventions through storage have taken several forms, as it can
be argued from different works. One set of models has analyzed the so-called
“buffer stocks” that are used by public agencies to stabilize agricultural prices
(Waugh, 1944, Oi, 1961, Massel, 1969). In these models storage costs and
final consumption. In emergency situations, gas price ceilings have been evoked, even
though in practice these measures can be temporary or not implemented. This was the
case, for instance, in California, in 2001, when the Long Beach City Energy Director,
considering that residential gas bills would likely have increased by about 34% compared
to the previous year, proposed a ceiling of $1 a therm (Bernstein et al., 2002). The decision
of the Aloha State to put into effect in August 2005 a new state law slapping a ceiling
on gasoline prices pegged to average prices on the mainland, has raised a debate on the
surplus enhancing effect of price controls in the oil and gas industries (Committee on
Energy and Commerce, 2005).
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management are simply abstracted away. Some trade models (for example,
Hueth and Schmitz, 1972, Just et al., 1977, Devadoss, 1992) analyze public
market interventions that protect national interests from imported price fluc-
tuations. Welfare gains are computed by comparing the economic situation
with and without stocks but storage is not optimized at the decentralized
level.
Williams and Wright (1991) have considerably enlarged the analysis of
storage in dynamic stochastic models. Unfortunately, the complexity of the
underlying dynamic model makes the characterization of the effectiveness and
efficiency of public interventions quite messy. Therefore, in the absence of
clear-cut explanations, only “rough” quantitative estimates of various welfare
effects of alternative government programs are computed numerically. Our
stylized model will simplify such evaluations.
In Section 2, we expose the main modeling assumptions. In Section 3,
we characterize the competitive equilibrium under mild assumptions. The
benchmark model opens the way to a detailed policy analysis in Section 4.
We test the model using US data in Section 5. The estimates enable us to
evaluate the impact on storage, prices and welfare of the policies we treated
theoretically. The final section concludes. Proofs as well as estimates of the
basic model are relegated to the Appendices.
2 The model
The section sets up the model and characterizes the equilibrium.
Supply and demand. Six-month periods alternate between summer S
and winter W . A period is denoted by yσ with y for year and σ for season.
The period that follows yσ is n(yσ) where n is for next; in particular n(yS) =
yW and n(yW ) = (y + 1)S. We also use nm(yσ) and n−m(yσ), with m a
positive integer, to indicate the mth period respectively after and before yσ.
The strictly decreasing consumption function at period yσ is denoted by
Consyσ[·]. Production at period yσ is denoted by Prodyσ[·]. Production is
non-decreasing with respect to the price. We assume that for all periods yσ,
consumption and production functions cross only once: the corresponding
equilibrium price is denoted p0yσ > 0. The difference between summer and
winter comes basically from the fact that the equilibrium summer price is
lower than the winter price. More precisely: p0yW ≥ p0yS and p0yW ≥ p0(y+1)S,
∀y. These natural conditions will directly make seasonal factors important
without assuming a purely cyclical repetition year after year.
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Due to storage, prices are not determined by short term equilibria. The
price in period yσ is denoted pyσ.
Competitive storage. Storage is assumed to be a competitive activity
with constant marginal cost c up to the maximum capacity K. The unit
storage charge in period yσ, denoted by κyσ, equals the marginal cost c if the
capacity constraint is slack, otherwise κyσ exceeds the marginal cost. The
interest rate from one period to the next is r.
Total inventories Gyσ, counted at the end of yσ, cannot be negative. Ra-
tional price-taking behavior leaves them null if there are no expected benefits
from storing. Those benefits come from capital gains (increase in unit price
of gas); costs are the direct rental price of storage (κyσ per unit) and the
foregone interest (stored gas does not bear interest). This can be expressed
as follows pn(yσ)
1 + r
< pyσ + c⇒ Gyσ = 0. (1)
An equivalent expression says that there are stocks only if prices follow a
precise evolution
Gyσ > 0⇒ pn(yσ)
1 + r
= pyσ + κyσ with κyσ ≥ c. (2)
To simplify the analysis, we summarize the response of the economy to
prices by the aggregate excess supply function
4yσ[·] ≡ Prodyσ[·]− Consyσ[·]. (3)
For each period, conservation of matter imposes that the excess supply in one
period (positive or negative) is exactly equal to the stocks variation equation
4yσ[pyσ] = Gyσ −Gn−1(yσ). (4)
No bubble. We can easily argue that in any equilibrium with reasonably
stable fundamentals, stocks have to revert to zero from time to time. A priori,
with endogenous prices and storage, the equilibrium could be a “bubble” in
which prices grow unboundedly after a certain period yσ, following the no-
arbitrage equation (2)
pnm+1(yσ) = (1 + r) · (pnm(yσ) + κnm(yσ)), ∀m, with κnm(yσ) ≥ c. (5)
With this explosion of price, consumption shrinks and production grows pe-
riod after period, implying ever increasing stocks, which is not credible. To
avoid the anomaly and retain only reasonable equilibria, it suffices to impose
that (5) is impossible.
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Equilibrium. Absent storage, periods are not linked to each other econom-
ically speaking. The equilibrium would be the unique sequence of prices p0yσ
equalizing consumption and production every period (4yσ[p0yσ] = 0,∀y, σ).
But if in some period yσ, prices are such that
p0n(yσ)
1 + r
> p0yσ + κyσ, (6)
then storage creates value and is expected in equilibrium. This is typically
the case if the price differential between successive prices is sufficiently high,
the interest rate and storage costs are sufficiently low.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium starts in period 0S,
with some stocks G0S; it is a sequence of gas prices pyσ, storage charges κyσ
and inventory levels Gyσ ≥ 0 such that, for all yσ after 0S
• if pn(yσ)
1+r
< pyσ + c then Gyσ = 0;
• if pn(yσ)
1+r
= pyσ + c then 0 ≤ Gyσ ≤ K;
• if pn(yσ)
1+r
= pyσ + κyσ with κyσ > c then Gyσ = K;
• 4yσ[pyσ] = Gyσ −Gn−1(yσ);
• stocks go to zero every so often (no-bubble condition).
Price-taking behavior of the agents, strictly increasing excess supply func-
tions, linearity of the storage technology, all these hypotheses suffice to ensure
that the competitive equilibrium maximizes the total surplus, obtained by
adding consumers’ and producers’ surpluses each period discounted at the
interest rate. We retrieve the classical virtue of competition.
3 Seasonal storage
After the elimination of bubbles, it remains to be established that the equi-
librium patterns are “simple”. This theoretical section shows that the alter-
nation between stockpiling in summer and complete utilization of the stock
in winter is a robust feature of the model.
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3.1 Basic pattern
If the price is p in some period, N [p] ≡ (1+r)(p+c) denotes the price realized
the subsequent period if storers decided to store. Consistently, Nm[p] denotes
the price attained after m seasons of uninterrupted stockholding.
The following condition restricts the rate at which supply and demand
(thus excess supply) change over time. It says in particular that if a price
p cause additional stockholding, then the price attained after two seasons
of uninterrupted stockholding—that is N2(p)—is significantly higher than p
and must cause additional stockholding two periods after.
Definition 2 The economy is said to be regular if for all seasons σ, all years
y and all prices p
4(y+1)σ[N2[p]] ≥ 4yσ[p]. (7)
If the economy’s fundamentals are purely cyclical (4yσ[·] does not change
from year to year), then the above condition is satisfied.
The following proposition states that storage in regular economies is dom-
inated by seasonal factors rather than by trends.
Proposition 1 (Seasonal pattern) If the economy is regular, then in any
competitive equilibrium, storage becomes seasonal (stocks are empty each year
at the end of winter) after a finite number of periods and remains so.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
If the economy starts with huge reserves, prices start low and increase
steadily season after season following the no-arbitrage equation (2). After
the reserves have been exhausted once, which is inevitable given the no-
bubble condition, the residual cycle would consist of stockpiling in summer
and depleting reservoirs in winter.
The seasonal cycle means that years are independent of each other. This
simplification enables us to characterize the equilibrium for any year y. As-
sume a large K to ensure that κyS = c. There are two cases. If p
0
yW/(1+r) ≤
p0yS+ c and there are no inventories, for lack of profitability. If p
0
yW/(1+r) >
p0yS + c, the two prices (pyS, pyW ) are determined by two fundamental equa-
tions: conservation of matter (equation 4), and no-arbitrage condition (equa-
tion 2). Storage smooths prices: the summer price increases and the winter
price decreases but remains higher. Consequences on consumptions are di-
rect: an decrease in summer and an increase in winter.
Figure 1 illustrates the case of the two-season equilibrium with linear
demand, a production function independent of the season (the year index is
dropped), and sufficient storage capacity K.3
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Figure 1: Unconstrained Competitive Storage.
3.2 Shocks
The property that stocks are fully used at the end of the winter is gener-
alizable to a stochastic version of the model. Assume that season specific
shocks impact the excess supply function (i.e., fundamentally, supply and
demand) and that this shock is known only at the beginning of the season.
This means simply that decisions made one season before were not informed
of the magnitude of the upcoming shock, whereas decisions taken during the
season take it into account. Temperature and weather conditions in general
are good examples.
The heuristic is the following. Take a deterministic economy as studied in
the previous paragraphs and assume conditions are met for a cyclical pattern.
If we perturb the model by adding “small” shocks then there is no possible
state of the economy in which speculators store at the end of the winter for
the coming summer. The question is to define “small”.
The first step to show that this approach works is to solve the equilibrium
3Remark that if K is saturated at the end of the summer, we have one more unknown
(κyS instead of c), and one more equation (GyS = K), which leaves the system solvable.
The endogenous storage charge generates a scarcity rent κyS − c.
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by treating each year separately assuming that each year starts and finishes
with empty stocks. This amounts to reasoning as if interyear storage were
forbidden. The resulting equilibrium prices are random: the summer price
depends on the summer shock (plus expectations as for the winter shock to
come), the winter price depends on the summer (through the past storage
decisions) and winter shocks. This generates the supports for summer and
winter prices. The second step is to search for conditions under which storage
from winter to summer is never desirable in any realization of the possible
states of nature. It suffices to compare the smallest possible winter price
with the expected subsequent summer price. If the former is high enough
(or equivalently, if the latter is low enough), then storage is never profitable.
This implies that stockout at the end of winters is systematic. The condition
to obtain this result is to have shocks of limited magnitude (with respect to
the no-storage price range) in both summer and winter.
3.3 Trends and cycles with exhaustible reserves
Natural gas is an exhaustible resource: the equilibrium cannot be stationary,
except if production and consumption become null. We examine now the im-
plication of this property for a “seasonal” model. We show that the economy
crosses three significantly different phases. The intermediate one, which may
be very long, exhibits interesting and empirically important cyclical features.
3.3.1 A simple model
We assume that finite gas reserves are concentrated at a unique wellhead H.
Consumption is concentrated in a unique region B (Burnertips). A pipeline
of capacity Q (per period) connects H and B. Marginal extraction cost is
cH, while marginal transportation cost along the pipeline is cT (both cH and
cT are assumed to be constant and stationary).
4 Storages are located at B.
Each period, gas can either be kept in the original field (i.e. not produced)
or stored in the consumption region once it has been transported there. The
difference between the gas field and storages lies in stockholding costs (zero
in the former and c per unit per period in the latter). See Figure 2 for a
simple illustration.
We assume that all agents are price-takers and that all arbitrage possi-
bilities (through transportation or storage) are exploited. The price at node
i (= H, B) and period yσ is denoted by piyσ. The unit profit at H for period
4Remark that Q could alternatively be interpreted as the maximum capacity of the
production sector.
9
Figure 2: Extraction, storage, burning.
yσ is pHyσ − cH, which, according to the Hotelling rule, grows at rate r. This
implies
pHn(yσ)
1 + r
− pHyσ = −
r
1 + r
cH < 0. (8)
The wellhead price grows more slowly than the interest rate.
We consider an economy in which gas demand functions in winter and
summer are stationary. Inverse demand functions in summer S and and
winter W are denoted by pS[·] and pW [·] respectively. To keep the economi-
cally appealing case in which seasonal storage is desirable when imports are
maximum (line is congested), we assume that pW [Q]/(1 + r) > pS[Q] + c.
To simplify matters, we assume that, during the first period, stocks are
empty (no domestic gas fields). We describe the situation at “the beginning”
(low prices), during the transition (intermediate prices) and at “the end”
(high prices). A more realistic description would be a model in which fields
are increasingly costly or increasingly remote from the consumption region as
depletion goes on. The effects for consumers would remain roughly identical
with similar phases.
3.3.2 Three phases
Large reserves/Low prices. Demand is high and the pipeline is fully
used in both seasons. In the absence of storage, prices would be pByS = pS[Q]
and pByW = pW [Q]. The assumption above on these prices ensures that there is
some storage G˜ taking place, the unique solution to the following no-arbitrage
equation
pW [Q+G]/(1 + r) = pS[Q−G] + c. (9)
The equilibrium prices are pByS = pS[Q− G˜] and pByW = pW [Q+ G˜].
The economy follows a trend at H, but is strictly cyclical at B (seasonal
consumer prices and quantities consumed or stored are constant). The total
profits (mineral rent plus pipeline congestion rent) are (pS[Q−G˜]−cH−cT)Q
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in summer and (pW [Q + G˜] − cH − cT)Q in winter. Remark also that this
globally constant rent is gradually transferred from the pipeline owners to
the reserve owners; indeed, pByσ increases over the years, whereas p
H
yσ is sta-
ble. Over time, the transportation network becomes less and less profitable.
Storage is competitive and thus produces no net profit.
Intermediate reserves/Intermediate prices. The line is congested in
one season only.
If the pipeline is fully used in winter only, the assumption according to
which pW [Q]/(1 + r) + c > pS[Q] ensures that some storage will take place.
The price in summer is the wellhead price plus transportation charge cT and
the price in winter is driven by the no-arbitrage condition
pByS = p
H
yS + cT, (10)
pByW = (1 + r)(p
B
yS + c). (11)
This is the normal and realistic situation.
In the case where congestion occurs in summer only, we have
pByS > p
H
yS + cT, (12)
pByW = p
H
yW + cT. (13)
By rearranging these two equations, we find
pByW
1 + r
− pByS < −
r
1 + r
(cH + cT). (14)
This precludes storage (the RHS is obviously smaller than c). Congestion in
summer always goes with no storage; this case is therefore quite unrealistic
but it cannot be logically excluded without making further assumptions on
demand functions.
Low reserves/High prices. The line becomes uncongested in both peri-
ods and necessarily pByσ = p
H
yσ + cT for each period, i.e.
pBn(yσ)
1 + r
− pByσ = −
r
1 + r
(cH + cT) < 0 < c. (15)
Prices grow more slowly at B than at H, a fortiori more slowly than the
interest rate. This eliminates any incentive for storage and the consumers
rely entirely on current imports. Remark that the mineral rent remains now
integrally in the hands of the producers.
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The first phase is specially relevant for economies that depend highly on
energy imports. Price observed at the local level may well be stationary for
a while, even if the world price follows the Hotelling rule. An interesting
feature of the second phase is diminishing reliance on storage and dissipation
of the pipeline rent.
4 Policy analysis
The independence between years guaranteed by Proposition 1 can be ex-
ploited to analyze policy within years. Consequently, the year index y will
be dropped in the following to make for easier reading. After analyzing basic
price caps, we characterize the best outcome a government can implement to
maximize consumers’ surplus as well as the instruments that can be used.
4.1 Price cap
A price cap only forces prices not to exceed a certain value, denoted by
p. Markets are otherwise competitive: economic agents take prices as given,
therefore the cap could generate a disequilibrium between supply (production
and release from inventories) and demand (consumption).
If p is higher than the winter price pW expected in the absence of a ceiling,
then it has no effect on the economy. If it is too low, it completely discour-
ages storage since the price dynamics motivating stockpiling in summer is
sterilized; this happens if p ≤ (1 + r) · (p0S + c).
For intermediate values ((1 + r) · (p0S + c) < p < pW ), we have the
economically interesting case where winter demand is larger than supply.
We assume in that case that consumption is rationed efficiently (consumers
with higher valuations are served first), which simplifies the calculation of
the surplus. In equilibrium, prices and stocks are denoted, respectively, by
pS, pW and G to show their dependency on the price cap p.
Proposition 2 For economically relevant price caps, i.e. (1+ r) · (p0S+ c) <
p < pW ,
1. Storage G, prices pW = p and pS =
p
1+r
− c decrease as p decreases;
consumers are rationed in winter;
2. Price caps slightly below the unconstrained competitive winter price pW
increase consumers’ surplus.
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Figure 3: Competitive Storage with Price Ceiling
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Though price ceilings succeed in reducing prices, price variability remains
little affected and storage is discouraged. The latter effect was mentioned in,
e.g., MacAvoy and Pindyck (1973) and Wright and Williams (1982b).
If the government in charge of setting the price cap defends the consumers’
interest only, then a price cap is desirable.5 There are obvious limits to
these gains: the deadweight loss is approximately quadratic with respect to
the difference between the price cap and the free price, while the price cap
generates an approximately linear transfer in favor of the consumers.
As price caps are a way of exerting market power, the result is in line with
monopsony pricing theory (here the state “coordinates” consumers through
the ceiling), with intertemporal effects due to competitive storage. The prac-
tical difficulty is not to go too far once the cycle is fully taken into account.
An improvement is to combine the price cap and the inevitable winter ra-
tioning with some summer rationing. As the rationing cost is approximately
quadratic with respect to the difference between demand and supply, rebal-
ancing rationing between seasons enhances welfare. This raises the issue of
5Symmetrically to the discouragement effect of the price cap, a price floor higher than
the undistorted one will create excess storage and therefore will sacrifice economic effi-
ciency (Helmberger and Weaver, 1977). Producers gain from the government policy, while
consumers lose.
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finding the optimal policy.
4.2 Optimal price policy
To optimize the consumers’ or the domestic surplus, we need to be more
specific as to fundamentals. The simplest approach is to represent consumers
with an intertemporal utility function; the arguments are gas consumption
and a separable nume´raire that could be seen as labor. The consumers yearly
surplus can then be written
US[q
C
S ]−mS +
UW [q
C
W ]−mW
1 + r
, (16)
where US and UW are increasing and concave utility functions, q
C
σ is season
σ gas consumption and mσ is season σ expenditure. The year index y is
dropped without loss of generality. Domestic production is simply modeled
through cost functions CDS [·] and CDW [·]; imports are represented with the
inverse supply functions pIS[·] and pIW [·] respectively. Storage is assumed to
be domestic.
The optimal policy in the interest of the residents (consumers plus domes-
tic producers) can be characterized using the following method: all quantities
(qCS and q
C
W , domestic productions q
D
S and q
D
W , and imports q
I
S and q
I
W ) are
taken as choice variables. Domestic production is accounted for its cost while
imports are accounted for the expenditure. The stocks are qDS + q
I
S− qCS . The
government solves
max
qCS ,q
C
W ,q
D
S ,q
D
W ,q
I
S ,q
I
W
US[q
C
S ]− CS[qDS ]− pIS[qIS]qIS
+
UW [q
C
W ]
1 + r
− CW [q
D
W ]
1 + r
− p
I
W [q
I
W ]q
I
W
1 + r
−c(qDS + qIS − qCS )
such that qDS + q
I
S + q
D
W + q
I
W ≥ qCS + qCW ,
qDS + q
I
S ≥ qCS .
The first constraint states that total consumption must not exceed total
production and imports. The second one states that stocks are positive.
We only discuss the case of strictly positive storage at the end of the
summer (the last constraint is slack). The necessary and sufficient conditions,
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after elimination of the Lagrange multipliers, are
U ′S[q
C
S ] = C
′
S[q
D
S ], (17)
U ′W [q
C
W ] = C
′
W [q
D
W ], (18)
U ′S[q
C
S ] + c =
U ′W [q
C
W ]
1 + r
, (19)
U ′S[q
C
S ] = p
I
S[q
I
S] + p
I′
S [q
I
S] · qIS, (20)
U ′W [q
C
W ] = p
I
W [q
I
S] + p
I′
W [q
I
W ] · qIW , (21)
qDS + q
I
S + q
D
W + q
I
W = q
C
S + q
C
W . (22)
The interpretation of the first three equations straightforward: equations
(17) and (18) only require that consumers’ marginal utilities equal domestic
marginal costs; (19) consumers’ intertemporal MRS should satisfy the no-
arbitrage equation (domestic storage must not be distorted). Equations (20)
and (21) show how the government should exert its monopsony power on
foreign producers.
Proposition 3 Compared to the competitive allocation, the best allocation
for consumers is such that consumptions, domestic productions and imports
at each period decrease. The benefits come from lower import prices each
period.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Storage may be greater with the optimal policy than under laissez-faire.
This possibility was existent with the less efficient price cap policy. Assume
for example that winter demand is very inelastic compared to summer de-
mand. Since production is reduced in both periods, winter demand can be
met only by discouraging summer demand. Given the elasticities, this is the
less distortionary choice; accordingly, one has to increase the stored quantity
of gas.
4.3 Implementation
The allocation maximizing domestic surplus can be sustained with tariffs
on imports each season (denoted by τS and τW ) and competitive markets.
No intervention is required in the domestic market (storage sector included):
consumption is not rationed and domestic storers simply arbitrage. Each sea-
son, the import price plus the tariff equals the domestic price. The domestic
prices are simply denoted pS and pW .
This gives:
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Domestic prices: pS = U
′
S[q
C
S ] = C
′
S[q
D
S ],
pW = U
′
W [q
C
W ] = C
′
W [q
D
W ].
Import prices: pIS = p
I
S[q
I
S],
pIW = p
I
W [q
I
W ].
Tariffs: τS = p
I′
S [q
I
S]q
I
S > 0,
τW = p
I′
W [q
I
W ]q
I
W > 0.
The interpretation of price policy in terms of taxation unifies the view
on the various policies that have been or could be observed or proposed. We
disagree withWright andWilliams (1982b) who write that “a price ceiling can
crudely substitute for an optimal tariff, if this latter cannot be implemented.”
Indeed, a price cap supposes controls and rationing, as we saw earlier; but
efficient rationing is extremely demanding in terms of information because
it requires knowledge of the private marginal valuations of all the consumers
whereas the tariff merely requires uniform application. The government can
implement the same allocation just by imposing a well calculated tax.6
Above all, optimal tariffs implement an optimally balanced “rationing”
(or preferably demand containment) between summer and winter, whereas
the version we discussed in 4.1 concentrates the effort on winter, which is
suboptimal. Moreover, as it is typical of second best policy, this primary
distortion must be mitigated by other distortions. The government may wish
to compensate the undesirable effects of the basic price cap (discouraging
storage) with subsidies on storage (or, if one prefers, subsidies across periods).
Tariffs are simpler.
5 Applications
The liberalization of the US gas market is now sufficiently well established
(Hirschhausen, 2007) to provide data on prices and quantities that can be
used to estimate structural parameters and test a number of our model’s
predictions (Appendix A.5). Though the results are satisfactory in many
ways, the accuracy of the estimates drawn from the aggregate approach is
insufficient to formulate firm predictions. With this reservation in mind,
6Wright and Williams (1982b) assumed that consumption is rationed by marketable
coupons distributed to consumers. Therefore, a kind of “secondary spot markets” must
exist for rationing to be efficient (the least costly in terms of welfare). This idea goes
against the principle of a price cap, since some transactions are indeed made above the
ceiling. In all events, such markets seem to be quite unlikely to emerge at the final
consumption level.
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we propose a comparative simulation of the impact of various price policies
discussed in Section 4.
Evaluation of the welfare effects of price policies. To focus on price
policies, we reason on the average year (sample average temperature, GDP,
number of wells). Linear demand and supply functions are integrated to give
linear-quadratic utility and cost functions. We compare three scenarios using
the structural parameters estimated under the assumption that markets are
competitive:
1. Pure competition.
2. The optimal price cap for residents (consumers and domestic producers)
with winter efficient rationing (see Subsection 4.1).
3. The residents’ optimum: tariffs only, no rationing (see Subsection 4.2).
We calculate optimal τS and and associated equilibrium prices and
quantities (see Subsection 4.3).
We start by estimating directly the structural equations of the model
under a linear specification using the 3SLS. For each year, the equilibrium
involves four equations: excess supplies in summer and in winter, price ar-
bitrage and annual balance. The observed variables for season yσ are the
variation of the stock, the average gas price, GDP and average temperature.
Appendix A.5 describes our procedure and results. The tests of theory based
linear restrictions and signs are passed.
The four core equations only require stock variations. To evaluate welfare,
we must complement them with some structural estimates of demand and
supply. In principle estimating precisely demand and supply would require a
more comprehensive dynamic theory and this route would be very demanding
in terms of data. We have limited ourselves to a very summary model. This
gives us a first complete set of parameters to perform comparisons such as
those exposed in Table 1. See Appendix A.6.
The total maximum surplus is set by convention to 0 in Table 1;7 other
surpluses are given as differences with the maximum. The optimal price cap
is overall less distortionary than optimal tariffs; the latter are nevertheless,
by definition, more attractive for residents. The optimal tariffs are very large
(about $7 per MMcf) and do more than halve the import price. This effect is
due to the relative inflexibility of imports. The price cap discourages storage,
as predicted, and more than tariffs, whose effect is ambiguous in theory.
7The value found by integration of the demand and supply functions is B$ 6.21. How-
ever this calculation involves extrapolating the functions well beyond the sample.
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Scenario Perfect comp. Opt. price cap Opt. tariffs
Total surp./year 0.00 −1.06 −1.84
Dom. surp./year −12.70 −11.50 −10.40
Stocks (106 ) 1.65 1.47 1.60
Summer
Import price 2.49 1.29 1.23
Domestic price 2.49 1.29 7.51
Tariff 0.00 0.00 6.28
Winter
Import price 2.56 1.60 0.91
Domestic price 2.56 1.60 8.08
Tariff 0.00 0.00 7.16
Table 1. Comparison of three price policies.
Quantities in MMcf, prices in $/MMcf, surpluses in M$.
A limit to this exercise is that, in accordance with the estimation results,
the optimal policy should be conditional on observables like temperature
or GDP. More importantly, though the elasticity of imports seems low and
thus “justifies” high tariffs, in the long run elasticity, through investment by
producers to deliver gas towards more profitable regions, is certainly much
greater. The extent of US market power over external providers is also hard
to measure. Obviously, the NAFTA prevents any such attempts towards
Canadian imports, which nevertheless leaves some leeway for other imports.
In any case, the modest extra surplus calculated (in absolute value) could be
seen to be upper bounds of the potential benefits.8
6 Conclusion
The model enabled us to expose a comprehensive view of seasonal natural
gas markets. Economies are neither stationary nor purely cyclical. One of
our insights is the description of a yearly pattern which is preserved one
considers moderate shocks and the exhaustibility of this natural resource.
This flexibility enables us to directly formulate our theory in a 4-equation
structural model. The estimates based on the US data over 1986-2005 are
consistent with a number of theoretical restrictions. The potential surplus
gains that the country could achieve are calculated.
8The interplay between tariffs and price cap was addressed by Wright and Williams
(1982), who analyze public policies as a response to an oil supply disruption due to ran-
dom shocks. However, in the Wright-Williams model, the relative effects of the two price
policies, namely the price cap and the import tariffs, are difficult to disentangle as embed-
ded in a very complex dynamic game, with government and the private sector interacting
strategically.
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Our analysis can be used as a building block of a model where one con-
siders regulatory issues such as access to storage or transportation charges.
If the storage capacity is saturated at the end of the summer, the endoge-
nous storage charge generates a scarcity rent. Under competition, allowing
usage rights with regulated storage prices or leaving prices unregulated only
changes the allocation of the rent, since the prices and quantities exchanged
and stored are unaffected. The rent is simply left to those who detain the
right to store. Both usage rights with regulated storage prices and unreg-
ulated prices lead to the social optimum in which the scarcity rent is the
marginal welfare loss due to the constraint. This equivalence is only true
in the short run; in the long run investment becomes a serious issue. For
regulators, the balance between preserving incentives to invest (rents) and
fighting market power requires information on the long run marginal cost,
whose evaluation is enormously complicated by the huge heterogeneity of
possible sites (location, geological characteristics). Though rents are not per
se proofs of noncompetitive behavior, the regulator must be able to distin-
guish a case of true scarcity from an abuse of market power via voluntary
restriction of supply. In this respect, the caution of FERC in allowing gas
companies to use market-based rates for storage access instead of regulated
tariffs, is understandable.9
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A Appendices
A.1 The US gas cycle
Weather is the primary driver of gas consumption. Because of winter heating,
the seasonal pattern of gas deliveries is particularly striking in the residential
and commercial sectors. Due to power-generation demand for summer cool-
ing, the electric utilities’ consumption is counter-cyclical (3.4 times higher
in July and August than in January and February). Nevertheless, the over-
all seasonal pattern is not offset: the yearly cycle alternates between winter
peaks and summer troughs. This is illustrated in Figure 4.
In contrast, extraction from gas wells as well as imports are practically
flat (see Figure 5). A smooth production is motivated by cost-efficiency ar-
guments driven by geological considerations.10 In addition, production and
transportation are highly capitalistic and complementary; the economic opti-
mum requires maximum utilization of the infrastructure and the profitability
of the investment is typically secured by long term contracts with limited flex-
ibility. Imports into the United States—almost entirely from Canada—show
slightly more of a seasonal pattern than US production, largely because of the
extensive use of Canadian upstream storage. The US gas industry is highly
diversified with no single dominant company. According to the Natural gas
Association, there are about 8,000 gas producers, ranging from small opera-
tions to major international oil companies. The five largest producers (BP,
ExxonMobil, Chevron-Unocal, Devon Energy, ConocoPhillips, Chesapeake
Energy) account for around 25% of total US output.
Storage plays a key role in balancing seasonal and short-term loads (com-
pare total consumption in Figure 4 with net withdrawals in Figure 5). Nat-
ural gas, unlike many other commodities, requires specialized facilities. There
are several types of storage: depleted gas or oil fields, aquifers, salt caverns,
liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanks. Pipelines can also be used for balancing
the transmission flows in order to keep gas pressure within design parame-
ters. Each type has its own economic and physical characteristics. In general,
storage facilities are classified according to flexibility (high or low withdrawal
and injection rates). The two main classes are high deliverability sites (salt
cavern reservoirs and LNG storages) and seasonal supply reservoirs (depleted
fields and aquifers). Most existing gas storage in the United States is in de-
pleted natural gas or oil fields that are close to consumption centers. Seasonal
supply reservoirs are usually drawn down during the heating season (about
150 days from November to March) and filled during the non-heating season
10For example, excess withdrawal of gas can submerge the wells with liquids (water,
oil), causing interruption of the gas flow.
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Figure 4: Gas consumption (total and by end use) (Tcf). Source: EIA.
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(about 210 days from April through October). High deliverability sites can
be rapidly drawn down (in 20 days or less) and refilled (in 40 days or less) in
order to respond to less expectable peak demands or system load balancing.
In 2005, the US industry had the capability to store approximately 8.2
trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas in about 391 storage sites around the
country, mostly in depleted gas or oil fields. Working gas capacity makes up
slightly less than 50% of the total. The rest goes to the base (or cushion)
gas, i.e. the permanent volume of gas in a storage reservoir necessary to
maintain adequate pressure and deliverability rates during the withdrawal
season. In 2005, the gas withdrawn from storage to end use was 3.047 Tcf,
which represents 13.2% of total gas supplies.
At the close of 2005, 394 underground natural gas storage facilities were
operational in the US although 37 were marginal operations that reported
little or no activity during the year. Between 1998 and 2005, 42 facilities were
abandoned as uneconomic or defective, representing a loss of 223 billion cubic
feet (Bcf) in total capacity, while 26 new sites, accounting for 212 Bcf of new
capacity, were placed in operation. Yet, as abandoned capacity was always
compensated for with new storage field development and the completion
of several storage expansion projects, working gas capacity and design-day
withdrawal capability (deliverability), the two prime measures of storage
utility in today’s natural gas storage market, grew steadily and substantially.
By 2008, more than 73 underground natural gas storage projects are expected
to be undertaken: they have the potential to add as much as 0.346 Tcf to
existing working gas capacity (EIA, 2006). New storage sites are mainly salt
caverns.
In recent years, the price of natural gas has followed an upward slope to
reach unprecedented levels. The development of new production capacity is
lagging behind growth in demand, which is also exacerbated by the use of
gas for electric power production. Because of the existence of a significant
amount of short-term fuel-switching capability in industry and power gen-
eration, interfuel competition plays a major role in day-to-day price setting.
This demand-side flexibility limits the seasonal volatility of spot prices: in
the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic, prices are effectively capped by prevailing
heavy-fuel-oil price levels in the winter, when oil typically replaces gas in
power generation and in some industrial uses. The ability of power genera-
tors to burn coal in the South effectively sets a ceiling price for gas in the
summer. The sustained tension on the market results in large spikes when
the temperature reaches unusually low levels in winter or unusually high lev-
els in summer. Accidents like the breakdown in 2001 of the El Paso pipeline
connecting California to Mexico or natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina
in 2005 had similar effects. In 2006, the prices have returned to levels closer
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Figure 6: Monthly natural gas price ($/Mcf). Source: EIA.
to historical average.
In this context, in contrast to previous decades, the seasonality of the
price is hardly visible in Figure 6. However, over the last twenty years, the
average price over the winter is significantly higher than the average price
during the previous summer.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The no-bubble condition imposes that the stocks become necessarily null
in finite time. We show by contradiction that from then on, stockholding
remains seasonal (holding stock two or more successive periods is impossible).
Suppose that there is an integer m ≥ 3 such that stocks are null at the
end of yσ, strictly positive at the end of the periods nj(yσ) for 1 ≤ j < m,
and null at the end of nm(yσ). The stock at the end of period nj(yσ) for
j ≤ m is
Gnj(yσ) =
j∑
i=1
∆ni(yσ)[N
i[pyσ]], (23)
Given that the economy is regular (see definition 2), for all j such that
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3 ≤ j ≤ m
Gnj(yσ) −Gn2(yσ) =
j∑
i=3
∆ni(yσ)[N
i[pyσ]] >
j−2∑
i=1
∆ni(yσ)[N
i[pyσ]] = Gnj−2(yσ).
(24)
This equation displays a contradiction for j = m : the LHS is negative, while
the RHS is positive.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
1. The parallel evolution of the two prices pS and pW is due to the no-
arbitrage equation ( pW
1+r
= pS + c) satisfied whenever storage is positive, and
to the fact that the constraint binds during peaks: pW = p. To see that stor-
age is discouraged, observe that demand during summer increases whereas
production decreases (as current price is decreased). This immediately im-
plies that in winter demand exceeds supply and consumers are rationed.
2. We start from the unconstrained competitive equilibrium. Let us
choose p = pW − dp, with small dp > 0. We get pW = p and pS = pS − dp1+r .
The impact on the consumer’s surplus during summer is positive and of
first order with respect to dp since they only benefit from the lower price.
During winter, on the one hand they benefit from lower prices (first-order
effect), but on the other hand, demand is increased (first-order) while supply
is decreased (negative first-order effects on production and storage). This
rationing only provokes second-order effects on winter surplus, therefore the
benefits dominate the loss for small dp.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Equation (19) holds in the competitive and the monopsony allocations, im-
plying that qCS and q
C
W are both higher or lower in the latter. We show by
contradiction that they are lower. Assume that qCS and q
C
W are higher. The
LHS of equations (20) and (21) decrease, meaning that qIS and q
I
W decrease.
Similarly, equations (17) and (18) imply that qDS and q
D
W also decrease. This
contradicts equation (22).
Remark that G = qDS + q
I
S − qCS . Depending on which of production and
consumption in summer is most impacted by the government policy, G in-
creases or decreases with respect to the competitive benchmark. One can
easily verify with a linear version of the model that both cases are possible.
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A.5 Estimation of the model
The econometric specification is based on the stochastic model discussed in
Section 3.2. The empirical counterpart of the model requires the arguably
exogenous controls ZyS = (TyS YyS)
′ and ZyW = (TyW YyW )′ (season average
temperature and GDP).11
The observed variables for season yσ are therefore
∆yσ : variation of the stock;
pyσ : average gas price;
Yyσ : GDP;
Tyσ : average temperature.
For each year, the four equilibrium equations are:
∆yS = β
0
1 + β1ppyS + (β1T β1Y )ZyS + εy1 (25)
∆yW = β
0
2 + β2ppyW + (β2T β2Y )ZyW + εy2 (26)
EpyW = β
0
3 + β3ppyS (27)
∆yW = β
0
4 + β4∆∆yS + εy4 (28)
All shocks have distributions with zero mean. Shocks εy1 and εy2 are unex-
pected random shifts in the excess supply functions (thus they can originate
in demand or supply) that are observable by economic agents when they
make their production or consumption decisions; as for εy4, see Tests 1 and
2 below.
We test the following restrictions:
1. β04 = 0 and β4∆ = −1 : total annual excess supply is null on average.
2. ∆yS +∆yW is not correlated with ∆(y+1)S: no catch-up, weak interan-
nual effects.
3. β1p ≥ 0 and β2p ≥ 0 : higher current prices increase excess supply.
11Also notice that underground storage capacity is not included in the estimation (e.g.
equation 26), as data on storage capacity are only available on a monthly basis as from
1993, whereas our dataset covers April 1986 to March 2005, thus resulting in a lack of
information for almost one third of the period considered. Moreover, those data show
little variability. From March 1993 to March 2005, underground storage capacity increase
amounts to .03% only. Finally, there is no empirical evidence of saturation (see Section
A.1).
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4. β1T ≤ 0 and β2T ≥ 0 : higher temperatures in summer decrease excess
supply (air-conditioning causes higher demand by electric utilities), and
higher temperatures in winter increase excess supply (less heating).
5. β1Y ≤ 0 and β2Y ≤ 0 : GDP essentially affects demand and thus must
impact excess supply negatively.
6. r ≥ 1 and c ≥ 0 : using equation (27), we can estimate r as β̂3p− 1 and
c as β̂03/β̂3p.
The first two tests challenge our annual approach; the others question
standard economic intuition.
A “year” y is composed of two six-month periods and starts with the
“summer” (accumulation period) and finishes with the “winter” (drainage
period). Using monthly data, we calculated the two consecutive six-month
periods that maximize the variability of the stock variation (in other terms
that smooth the cycle the least possible) over the sample. The best aggre-
gates we find are 2nd and 3rd quarters for the summer, 4th quarter and
1st quarter of the subsequent year for the winter. Price and temperature
averages as well as GDP are calculated for the same periods.
A more complete dynamic analysis of the yearly cycle using original
monthly data would be inextricable (in particular, identification problems
due to the multiplication of seasonal, i.e. month-specific, effects). Still, the
simplicity argument apart, one may question the validity of the proposed
time aggregation. Remark that if piS is the gas price for the ith summer
month (i = 1, ..., 6), and if r and c are, respectively, the opportunity cost
of capital and the carrying costs over six months, then, due to continued
storage, arbitrage predicts that the price in the ith winter month piW equals
(1 + r)(piS + c). The six equations that we obtain as i varies can be summed
up and divided by six to yield pW = (1 + r)(pS + c), in which the prices
are the season averages in the considered year. Moreover, if we assume that,
each month, excess supply depends linearly on the current price, the current
temperature and the current GDP, then the linear specification of excess
demand is also preserved by time aggregation.
The dataset covers April 1986 (year in which deregulation started) to
March 2005. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and sources.
Descriptive statistics. We used the monthly data published by the EIA,
aggregated into two seasons per 12-month period from April 1986 to March
2005. Temperature data are from the National Climatic Data service (US
Department of Commerce), whereas GDP quarterly data are obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department of Commerce).
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Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
GDPS B$ 8313 1439 6262 10846
GDPW B$ 8317 1436 6265 10838
Wells # 307129.7 49949.19 241527 401480
TS
◦F 62.77842 .6637795 61.57 63.88
TW
◦F 44.41 .145406 41.97 46.71
∆S MMcf 1638388 325292.7 1160000 2262996
∆W MMcf −1649048 294352.6 −2323528 −1163000
Dom. prod. S MMcf 9331938 621662 7970839 1.01× 107
Dom. prod. W MMcf 9600006 303795 8898230 1.01× 107
Net imp. S MMcf 1282275 453669 469932 1930174
Net imp. W MMcf 1164139 505577 261408 1819766
pS $/Mcf 2.46 1.13 1.46 5.42
pW $/Mcf 2.53 1.22 1.56 5.57
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Note: MMcf = one million cubic feet, Mcf = one thousand cubic feet. GDP in annual
value.
Results. We use 3SLS, a method that estimates the covariance matrix
of the shocks and does not require normal distributions of the shocks for
consistency. Test 1 is passed in a first 3SLS run, so we impose β04 = 0 and
β4∆ = −1 in the final estimation. This hardly changes the estimates. As for
Test 2: the correlation is −.299 with standard error .185 (corresponding to a
probability of .126 under the null hypothesis). Though catch-up effects seem
not to be absent, their magnitude is low.
Equation (27) is replaced by
pyW = β
0
3 + β3ppyS + εy3, (29)
where εy3 represent winter shift (correlation with εy1 is allowed, meaning
that the shift may be partially anticipated). Tests 3, 4 and 5 are passed
successfully. The estimate for the interest rate is r̂ = 10%, whereas there is
no significant evidence of the impact of storage unit cost (ĉ is not significantly
different from 0). Overall, the theory we exposed is not contradicted by the
data. See Table 3.
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Equation Coeff. St. Err. z P > | z|
∆yS = · · ·
Constant 1.57× 107 6.82× 106 2.30 .022
pyS 2.50× 105 1.46× 105 1.72 .086
Y yS −35.4 93.2 −0.38 .705
T yS −2.29× 105 1.05× 105 −2.18 .029
∆yW = · · ·
Constant −5.51× 106 1.78× 106 −3.08 .002
pyW 2.58× 105 1.10× 105 2.33 .020
Y yW −336 91.6 −3.66 .000
T yW 1.35× 105 4.76× 104 2.84 .005
pyW = · · ·
Constant −.168 .181 −0.93 .351
pyS 1.10 .068 1.47
∗ .144∗
∗ Tested against 1.
Table 3. Core equations of the seasonal storage model.
A.6 Production and imports
We ran regressions of domestic production and net imports on the current
price. The results are not stable (exclusion of a particular year or inclusion of
normally irrelevant explanatory variables have an impact on the estimates)
and tend to exhibit excess price elasticity (derived effect of price on demand
has the wrong sign). This happens whether we include the production equa-
tions in the previous system (3SLS) or estimate them separately (OLS/2SLS).
In contrast, the four core equations (25)-(28) give similar estimates with the
three methods.
One obvious reason for this is that production largely depends on produc-
tive capacity, which we thus proxied with the number of active wells given
by the EIA. This indicator does not account for the extreme heterogeneity
between wells; nevertheless, the predicted price elasticities are now lower,
indicating that we are more in line with the short term logic we put forward.
Remark that the dynamics of this kind of data is extremely hard to capture
in a model.12 We restricted the sample to years 1993 to 2005, the period
between 1986 and 1992 having a strong influence on the estimates. See Ta-
ble 4 . The small sample cannot warranty precise estimates. In accordance
with economic intuition, the implied price elasticity of demand is now nega-
tive; the impact of prices on domestic production is not significant, whereas
imports are price-inelastic.
Once domestic production and net import parameters are known, demand
12See the classic Balestra and Nerlove (1966) on the modeling of demand for natural
gas with consideration of the stock of appliances.
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parameters are calculated using the accounting identity (3).
Equation Coeff. St. Err. z P > |z|
Summer dom. prod.
Constant 8.60× 106 9.18× 105 9.37 .000
pyS −1.40× 105 1.27× 105 −1.10 .280
Wells 4.59 3.66 1.25 .217
Summer net imp.
Constant 1.05× 106 1.44× 105 7.29 .000
pyS 2.08× 105 4.66× 104 4.46 .000
Winter dom. prod.
Constant 1.08× 107 6.47× 105 16.71 .000
pyW 9070 8.47× 104 0.11 .915
Wells −3.18 2.58 −1.23 .226
Winter net imp.
Constant 1.19× 106 1.31× 105 9.09 .000
pyW 1.92× 105 4.03× 104 4.78 .000
Table 4. Domestic production and imports.
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